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ARGUMENT 
I. PARR WADDOUPS OVERSTATES THE REACH OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE ELEMENTS DEFINED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
Appellees Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, a Utah 
professional corporation; Clark Waddoups ("Waddoups"); Jonathan O. 
Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin") (collectively "Parr 
Waddoups") argue in their Appellees' Brief for a broad and sweeping 
definition of the judicial proceedings privilege, asserting that the arguments 
of Appellants Susan I. Moss ("Moss") and Jamal S. Yanaki ("Yanaki") in 
their Opening Brief about the judicial proceedings privilege is properly 
applied are "contrary to clear case law and the policy implications that 
support such law." Appellees' Brief, at 11. 
What Moss and Yanaki had argued was: 
[The Lawyer] Defendants are not being sued in this case for 
making any defamatory statement or, indeed, any statement at 
all. They are instead being sued for illegally searching 
plaintiffs' home and removing plaintiffs' property. Not one of 
the privilege cases cited by defendants involves suit over a 
non-consensual and illegal warrantless entry into a plaintiffs 
home and conduct of an illegal search and seizure. 
Opening Brief, at 29-30. Moss and Yanaki has carefully analyzed all of the 
Utah Supreme Court cases which had been decided on the judicial 
proceedings privilege issue and none of them had approved the application 
1 
of the privilege in the absence of some defamatory statement. Appellees' 
Brief cites Utah cases which were already discussed in footnote 8 on page 
30 of the Opening Brief and that discussion will not be repeated here. 
However, a more recent case from the Utah Supreme Court which Parr 
Waddoups had not raised below but which they touch on in the Appellees' 
Brief, at 11-12, O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214, also 
supports Moss and Yanaki's argument. 
In O'Conner, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly, plainly and clearly 
set forth the required elements for the application of the judicial 
proceedings privilege in this state: 
The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the 
alleged defamatory statement must have been made during 
or in the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the 
statement must have some reference to the proceeding's 
subject matter. Third, the party claiming the privilege must 
have been acting in the capacity of a judge, juror, witness, 
litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the time of the alleged 
defamation. 
O'Conner, 2007 UT 58, fl 31, 165 P.3d at 1222-23 (emphasis added). 
Although this aspect of the case is not addressed by Parr Waddoups, at 
the core of each of the three elements required for the application of the 
judicial proceedings privilege is the requirement that "an alleged 
defamatory statement" is the center of all of the claims as to which the 
judicial proceedings privilege may be applied. This is precisely 
2 
what Moss and Yanaki argued that the elements of the privilege required, 
so their arguments are not only not "contrary to clear case law and the 
policy implications that support such law[ ]" their arguments are precisely 
correct. 
If the judicial proceedings privilege were capable of being applied in 
the broad scope suggested by Parr Waddoups, there could be no tort of 
abuse of process, no sanctions under Rule 11 and, indeed, no sanctions of 
any kind for any conduct of a litigant or its counsel, because so long as the 
conduct leading to sanctions occurred during the course of litigation, had 
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding and the litigant or 
lawyer were a litigant or lawyer, the judicial proceedings privilege would 
protect them absolutely from abuse of process claims or sanctions.1 
1Although Parr Waddoups asserts that "Courts . . . have routinely held that 
the privilege applies to abuse of process claims[,]" Appellees' Brief, at 13, Parr 
Waddoups apparently could not find any Utah court decisions routinely reaching 
such a holding. An analysis of the California case cited by Parr Waddoups 
reveals that the Court's holding is based on the unique statutory law of California, 
reflecting a policy of its Legislature to extend the privilege beyond merely 
allegedly defamatory communications, to encompass any communication in 
judicial proceedings. Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057, 128 P.3d 713, 
718, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 522 (2006). In addition, the only wrongful conduct 
before the court in Rusheen appears to have been the "filing [of] perjured 
declarations of service . ..." Id, 37 Cal. 4th at 1062, 128 P.3d at 722, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 526. So the court concluded that, "[o]n close analysis, the gravamen 
of the action was not the levying act, but the procurement of the judgment based 
on the use of allegedly perjured declarations of service. Because these 
declarations were communications '(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve 
(continued...) 
3 
In sum, Parr Waddoups' proposal that the judicial proceedings 
privilege may be applied, in this state, to tort claims that are not somehow 
grounded in the making of an alleged defamatory statement is a proposal 
that stretches far beyond any application of the privilege that has been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. Because the English Common 
Law has plainly allowed for tort actions to redress injury caused by torts 
committed under the auspices of an illegal order for at least a quarter of a 
millennium, see Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520, 
479 A.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1984) and that pre-existing English Common Law 
was adopted by the Utah Legislature as the law of this state upon 
statehood, see American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 401j 50 
& n.17, 140 P.3d 1235, 1250-51 & n.17 ("The common law of England, so 
far as It is not repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of 
the United States, or the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the 
rule of decision in all the courts of this state." [quoting UTAH REV. STAT. § 
1(...continued) 
the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation 
to the action" [citation omitted], the litigation privilege applies to the declarations 
and protects against torts arising from the privileged declarations.'" Id., 37 Cal. 
4th at 1062, 128 P.3d at 722, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 526-27. In remarkable contrast, 
in this action, Parr Waddoups, together with their co-conspirators, threatened to 
kick in the door to a private home, entered the private home without consent and 
then embarked on an illegal search and seizure. 
4 
2488 (1898)]), Moss and Yanaki's common law claims alleged in this case, 
which are not derived from any allegation of a defamatory statement, but 
instead from an illegal home invasion, are secured to Moss and Yanaki by 
statute.2 
II. THE ORDER PARR WADDOUPS OBTAINED WAS ILLEGAL AND SO 
PROVIDES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED 
As their principal argument asking this Court to ignore the binding 
precedent of Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941), 
in which the Utah Supreme Court held private search warrants to be 
2Parr Waddoups cites several other cases. Many involve California law, 
which, as discussed in Note 1, supra, is grounded on a unique statutory definition 
of the judicial privilege in which the California Legislature saw fit to expand the 
privilege beyond its historical limits of application to claims grounded upon 
defamatory statements. Because the explanatory parenthetical used by Parr 
Waddoups on its citation to Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. V.Griffith, 559 S.W. 2d 
791 (Tenn. 1978) gives the impression that the privilege applies in blanket 
fashion to all invasion of privacy claims, see Appellees Brief, at 14, that case 
must be addressed. In Lambdin, the underlying conduct upon which the invasion 
of privacy claim was based was "the publication by the defendant of alleged acts 
of misconduct by the plaintiff." Id., at 792. Thus, again unlike this case, the 
claims were grounded in an alleged defamatory statement and it is in that context 
that an invasion of privacy claim would be barred by the judicial proceedings 
privilege and not by the unauthorized entry into a private home. In fact, none of 
the cases cited by Parr Waddoups address the situation of an illegal search and 
seizure conducted within a private home. Likewise, Parr Waddoups' citation to 
Thornton v. Rhoden, 53 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1966), with 
the explanatory parenthetical stating: "abuse of process based on discovery 
allegedly conducted for improper purposes[,]" Appellees' Brief, at 14-15, in fact 
involved allegedly defamatory statements made in a deposition. See id., 53 Cal. 
App. 2d at 82, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 708. So, again, the underlying basis of the 
claimed abuse of process related to defamatory statements. That is not the case 
here. 
5 
unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah Constitutions, Parr 
Waddoups states: "[T]he search warrant at issue in Allen improperly 
imported criminal procedures into a civil lawsuit; the search warrant was 
not styled as a discovery order issued pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . .." Appellees' Brief, at 30 (emphasis added). Moss and 
Yanaki submit first that it is the substance of what an order purports to 
allow, rather than how it is styled, which governs whether the order violates 
their constitutional rights. The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that 
"[the Court] ha[sj held that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth 
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007 
UT 47, 16, 164 P.3d 397, 404. The proposition that the name placed on 
an illegal order purporting to authorize a search of a private home by the 
police, private litigants and their attorneys would somehow make it legal is 
contrary to the afore-stated jurisprudential analysis of the right of privacy in 
Utah. The facts of Allen are substantively distinguishable from the facts in 
this case only in the fact that in this case the privacy interests invaded 
were of even greater significance because a private home which was 
invaded by the police, litigants and their counsel, while in Allen it was a 
place of business which was illegally searched. Allen, 100 Utah at 43, 
6 
110P.2d355.358. 
While Parr Waddoups desires to characterize the order as a 
"discovery order," Appellees' Brief, at 30, no provision of the rules of civil 
procedure ostensibly authorize an ex parte home invasion and search by 
the police, litigants and their counsel, such as was conducted here, as a 
discovery device. If the discovery rules did purport to authorize such a 
private search warrant, they would nevertheless be unconstitutional under 
the holding in Allen. The same is true for Parr Waddoups' argument that 
the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorizes such a private search 
warrant, see Appellees Brief, at 26.3 Allen holds such invasions of privacy 
to be unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions and such 
3ln any event, Parr Waddoups already argued to the federal court that Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorized such a discovery process and that 
argument was rejected. Yanaki v. lomed, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (D. Utah 
2004)("neither does the Act authorize the particular variety of discovery process 
of which [Moss and Yanaki] complain[ ].") Indeed, the Court held: "The fact that 
the statutes and constitutional provisions lomed [and Parr Waddoups] identified 
in its Memorandum do not provide any authority for the particular type of Search 
Order obtained in this case is central to Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted." Id. It is no doubt for that reason that Parr Waddoups 
chose not to appeal that ruling of the federal court, but having prevailed in part on 
that basis in federal court and choosing not to appeal, issue preclusion now 
applies: "Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements are met: 
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the 
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and 
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Oman v. 
Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70, U 29, 194 P.3d 956, 965. 
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invasions remain unconstitutional under any and every act or rule which 
may be enacted unless and until the Constitution itself is amended. 
Parr Waddoups also contends that the illegal search was otherwise 
reasonable. See Appellees' Brief, at 30. The same assertion was made 
by the same Parr Waddoups parties in Yanaki v. lomed, Case No. 
2:03CV0345 DB. See Exhibit A to "Notice of Filing of Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah , Case No. 2:03cv0345 DB, Which 
Memorandum Was Referenced and Submitted in Oral Argument in this 
Action on February 15, 2007" (R. 587-608), at R.595-598. Parr Waddoups 
previously made this argument to Judge Benson as a basis for dismissal of 
the federal lawsuit, and lost on this issue. See Yanaki v. lomed, 319 F. 
Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 n.7 ("Nonetheless, it appears clear that the conduct 
complained of in this case would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment if 
state action were involved. The invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only 
by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears 
to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling 
that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent.") Again, Parr 
Waddoups did not appeal, even though it lost this issue, and so issue 
preclusion applies. 
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Moreover, Parr Waddoups, although claiming that the search was 
reasonable "in the interest of preserving . . . evidence." Appellees' Brief, at 
25. As was already pointed out in the Opening Brief, however, the 
"Confidential New Product" Yanaki was alleged to have stolen could not be 
described in any way in written form. Opening Brief, at 22-23. Moreover, 
there was no danger that Yanaki was going to destroy evidence when, as 
pleaded, he was in the state of Colorado. First Amended Complaint, fl 15, 
R. 133. Indeed, Yanaki's last day of employment had been January 17, 
2002, R. 50)(lomed Complaint, Tj 50), but the supposedly exigent search 
did not occur for three months thereafter, First Amended Complaint, fl 8, 
R. 131 (yet lomed had received an e-mail shortly after Yanaki left 
employment supposedly evidencing a disclosure of trade secrets, R. 51 
(lomed Complaint, j | 39)). 
Perhaps most tellingly, however, and supportive of the ulterior motive 
pleaded in the First Amended Complaint, fflj 8-9, 32 (that the search was in 
fact designed to send a message to lomed employees that they were not 
safe if they left employment) is the fact that Parr Waddoups chose to 
search the private home of Moss and Yanaki rather than the business 
premises of Yanaki's co-defendant, Ceramatec, Inc. or the home of co-
defendant Ashok Joshi, who had never been an lomed employee. 
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Certainly, Ceramatec, Inc. and Joshi held the same evidence that Yanaki 
was accused of holding. But only an ex-lomed employee's home was 
selected for an illegal search. No matter whether the protection of 
evidence was at issue, Allen instructs that a private search warrant is not, 
under Utah law, the way to go about obtaining that evidence.4 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PETITION GOVERNMENT DOES NOT 
PROTECT DEFENDANTS AGAINST TORTS ARISING FROM THEIR ILLEGAL 
INVASION OF MOSS AND YANAKI'S HOME. 
This alleged defense is in reality a red herring. First of all, "the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine[ ] provides immunity from antitrust liability for 
petitions to the courts, provided that those petitions are objectively 
reasonable." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 916, 913 (10th Cir. 2000). Parr 
Waddoups is not being sued over antitrust liability. Parr Waddoups is also 
not being sued because it or its client petitioned the government for 
4lt is worth noting at this point that Parr Waddoups' arguments about 
Courts "routinely" granting such ex parte search and seizure orders is not a 
justification to allow such an unconstitutional practice, if it actually is such, to 
continue. Parr Waddoups mentions the Copyright Act's permission for such ex 
parte seizures. Appellees' Brief, at 28 n.13 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 503(1), 503(3)). 
However, even though seizures under that Act have proceeded under very 
specific rules drafted by the United States Supreme Court, significant 
constitutional questions remain about the legitimacy of seizures under the 
Copyright Act. See generally Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures under 
the Copyright Act: the Constitutional Infirmities, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211 (Fall 
1985). But, again, the Utah Supreme Court has spoken definitively in Allen, 
outlawing such procedures in Utah. 
10 
redress by filing a complaint against Yanaki, ActivaTek, L.C., Ceramatec, 
Inc. or Ashok Joshi. Nor is Parr Waddoups being sued for seeking 
discovery under the rules of civil procedure. 
Parr Waddoups is instead being sued for the commission of torts 
exclusively related to the unlawful invasion of Moss and Yanaki's home 
and the conduct of an illegal search and seizure therein. As the United 
States Court of Appeals recognized in the context of the tort of false 
imprisonment, the tort's element of illegality "effectively prevents any 
infringement on or chilling of. . . First Amendment rights by the instant 
action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 916 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, the 
unconstitutional and illegal nature of the invasion of the home, themselves, 
effectively prevent any infringement upon or chilling of legitimate rights, 
lomed and the Parr Waddoups lawyers were free to make use of any legal 
form of discovery they wished. Instead, they chose to engage in illegal 
conduct designed to frighten their client's remaining employees. 
In Anderson Development Co., LC. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 
323, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment 
protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine had evolved beyond antitrust 
liability, but only so far as "to 'protect. . . political activity against tort 
claims as well as antitrust claims,' Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 
11 
(Utah 1982)." Anderson Development, at H 26, 332 (emphasis added). 
This case, like it involves no antitrust claims, also involves no tort claims 
arising out of political activity. No court, in Utah or outside of Utah, has 
extended such First Amendment protections to encompass invading 
someone's private home. 
IV. NEITHER MOSS NOR YANAKI ARE PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THEIR 
CLAIMS BY VIRTUE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION. 
Parr Waddoups alleges that Moss and Yanaki could have and should 
have appealed from the illegal order in the underlying lomed litigation and 
that their failure to do so precludes them from raising their tort claims here. 
This argument fails for many reasons. 
First, Moss was not a party to the underlying litigation in which Parr 
Waddoups sued Yanaki. She was a non-party who was simply abused by 
Parr Waddoups invasion of her home and privacy. Moss was not in a 
position to intervene at any time prior to the invasion of her home, as she 
has neither claims nor defenses to assert. The claims Moss acquired upon 
the occurrence of the illegal home invasion are utterly unrelated to any 
underlying merits of the underlying lomed case against Yanaki, so she 
would not even have a permissive basis to intervene in that action, 
because no statute conferred upon her any conditional right to intervene 
12 
and she had no claim or defense which has a question of law or fact in 
common with the claims asserted in the lomed litigation. See UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 24(b)(permissive intervention allowed only "(1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense 
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.") 
Yanaki, as a party to that litigation, could have appealed from a final 
judgment on the merits in the case, but none was ever entered because it 
was settled. Perhaps he could have filed a petition for permission to file a 
discretionary appeal of the illegal ex parte order but there was no effective 
relief available to him from such an application. By the time Yanaki 
returned to the state of Utah, the illegal invasion of his home , the terrorism 
of his wife and the seizure of his property were a fait accompli. The privacy 
of Moss and Yanaki had been irretrievably shattered and no appeal of that 
order could ever make right the wrong which occurred. No Appellate Court 
could provide any effective remedy for what had already occurred and the 
law does'ribt require Yanaki to engage in a useless act of appeal when 
only damages will remedy the injury. See Leger Construction v. Roberts, 
Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976)(law will not require one to do a 
useless thing). 
In addition, the elements of issue preclusion, which is the modern 
13 
name for the collateral estoppel which Parr Waddoups argues, are not met. 
Unlike the case of Buzzanco v. Lord Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D. Pa. 
2001), in which Parr Waddoups concedes that "the court recognized that 
one of the plaintiffs had brought a motion in the underlying case post-
seizure regarding the seizure order and the judge had 'confirmed the 
issuance of the writ."' Appellees Brief, at 24. Thus, unlike here, a specific 
challenge to the legality of the order had been raised, litigated and ruled on 
in Buzzanco. 
Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements 
are met: (i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted 
must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must 
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the 
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and 
fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Oman v. Davis School District, 2008 UT 70, U 29, 194 P.3d 956, 965. 
Here, the issue was not fully and fairly litigated by the trial court which had 
issued the ex parte order in the underlying case. Moss was neither a party 
nor in privity with Yanaki with respect to the lomed case. The issue 
decided by the trial judge was not identical with the issues raised here and, 
finally, because the lomed case was settled, there was no final judgment 
on the merits. In sum, the requisite elements for the application of issue 
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preclusion are absent. 
V. Moss AND YANAKI'S CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY PLEADED. 
Moss and Yanaki refer to their Opening Brief on the question of 
whether their claims were adequately pleaded under Rule 8, with the 
exception of Parr Waddoups' argument that an "independent, willful act" 
has not been pleaded for the abuse of process claim. The conduct of an 
illegal search and seizure as pleaded plainly constitutes a willful and 
independent act. So, too, does the threat to kick in Moss front door if she 
did not open it. Since private search warrants are unconstitutional under 
both the federal and state constitutions, it is not possible for any civil 
process to have as its legitimate end the unconstitutional invasion of a 
private citizen's home. Indeed, Parr Waddoups even seized property 
belonging to Moss, a non-party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the sake of upholding the proscription of the Utah Constitution 
against unreasonable searches and seizures of private citizens' homes, as 
well as the remaining reasons set forth herein and in the Opening Brief, the 
dismissal of Moss and Yanaki's tort claims should be reversed, the claims 
reinstated and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
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